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Abstract: In this essay I first set out the advantages the “multivariate democratic polity” 
framework proposed by Ferrara offers in comparison to other more consensus-based 
notions of democratic legitimacy. Secondly, I highlight some ambiguities concerning the 
meta-theoretical status of this frame, since it is not clear whether it consists of an adaptive 
realistic description, or otherwise is a normative argument. Thirdly, I cast some doubts 
on the compatibility between the multivariate frame and the “dualist conception of 
democratic constitutionalism” adopted by Ferrara, since the latter seems too indebted to 
the domestic analogy, and to a consensus-based model of legitimacy. Finally, I argue that 
the dualist approach does not seem a convenient way to include citizenship in deliberative 
processes, and the question of the emergence of a transnational demos should rather be 
reconsidered as crucial for this purpose. 
[Keywords: Democratic Legitimacy, Overlapping Consensus, Pluralism, Deliberation, 
Demos] 
 
The Democratic Horizon is a conceptually rich, creative and thought-provoking book, 
which exhibits an example of political philosophy at its best, exploring crucial issues for 
contemporary social thought and proposing a number of innovative conceptual tools to 
deal with ongoing transformations of democratic legitimacy. In this essay I will 
concentrate on what I assume to be one of the most promising conceptual frameworks 
developed by Alessandro Ferrara, that is his notion of “multivariate democratic polity”. I 
will first set out the advantages the multivariate framework offers in comparison to other 
more consensus-based notions of democratic legitimacy. Secondly, I will highlight some 
ambiguities concerning the meta-theoretical status of this model, since it is not clear 
whether it consists of an adaptive realistic description of the present state of multicultural 
democratic polities, or otherwise is a normative argument on how their political 
legitimacy should be better conceived. In a third step, I will cast some doubts on the 
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compatibility between the multivariate frame and the “dualist conception of democratic 
constitutionalism” Ferrara adopts in order to rethink democratic legitimacy in a 
transnational context. In particular, I will argue that whereas the multivariate framework 
is a promising point of departure in order to capture the transnational transformation of 
democratic polities, the dualist conception is still too indebted to the domestic analogy, 
and to a consensus-based model of legitimacy, and as such cannot capture multilevel 
processes of postnational constitutionalization and governance adequately. Finally, I will 
analyze the governance-based notion of transnational democratic authorship which 
Ferrara proposes and try to clarify its normative criteria. I will argue that once we adopt 
a deliberative model of democracy as Ferrara does, then it should be the deliberative 
process which establishes the criteria for the evaluation of the legitimacy of governance 
practices. But if this is the case, then again the dualist approach does not seem a 
convenient way to include citizenship in deliberative processes, and the question of the 
emergence of a transnational demos should rather be reconsidered as crucial for this 
purpose. 
Hyperpluralism and multivariate democratic polity 
The whole project of The Democratic Horizon strives towards a non-procedural definition 
of democracy based on a pluralized notion of democratic ethos – understood as “passion 
for openness”1 – and on a pluralistic model of its political justification. Accordingly, 
“reflexive pluralism” (see DH, pp. 67 ff.) is meant to be a strategy that should allow for 
a plurality of arguments for the acceptance of liberal democratic pluralism, thus avoiding 
the petitio principii – and subsequent performative contradiction – of monist accounts 
based from scratch on the liberal notion of autonomy. The idea is that pluralism could be 
justified proceeding from a variety of premises which could be legitimately interpreted 
as immanent to the respective central categories of different religious, metaphysical and 
moral comprehensive conceptions. These arguments would have the form of what Rawls 
labelled as conjectural arguments, that is arguments where we “argue from what we 
                                                                                                                                               
 
1 A. Ferrara, The Democratic Horizon. Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism, New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2014, henceforth DH, pp. 48-51. 
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believe, or conjecture, are other people’s basic doctrines”.2 As such, conjectural 
arguments are arguments that do not presuppose shared premises.  
So far, Ferrara’s model is an extension of the model of overlapping consensus to 
the problem of the justification of ethical pluralism, which should allow us to address the 
question, neglected by both Rawls and Habermas, “Why be pluralist in the first place?” 
(DH, pp. 71-72). A theoretical change happens when Ferrara, in chapter four of DH, 
introduces the notion of “hyperpluralism” (DH, pp. 91 ff.). This is at first negatively 
characterized as a situation where immanent conjectural arguments for the endorsement 
of pluralism do not work. “What happens when conjectural arguments fail to convince 
minorities to endorse the “political values”, to accept pluralism and to join in the existing 
constitutional consensus?” (DH, p. 15). According to Ferrara, hyperpluralism is a notion 
that describes the actual conditions in which contemporary democracy operates and then 
represents a major challenge that cannot be solved within the limits of classical political 
liberalism, forcing us to adopt new vocabularies and conceptual tools. As such, 
hyperpluralism is understood as the condition in which some comprehensive conception 
endorsed by a majority of people, or even a sizeable minority, can reach an overlapping 
consensus on the basic structure and all the constitutional essentials. Whereas some other 
comprehensive conceptions endorsed by minorities – or even by a majority of minorities 
– cannot reach an overlapping consensus on the basic structure of society on all the 
constitutional essentials – perhaps they endorse some constitutional essentials on the basis 
of conjectural arguments and some others on the basis of prudential arguments, or even 
none on the basis of conjectural arguments and all of them only on the basis of prudential 
arguments (DH, pp. 105-107). 
Hyperpluralism is then conceived as a situation where a widespread overlapping 
consensus based on conjectural arguments cannot be attained. The “multivariate 
democratic polity” is here proposed by Ferrara as the best answer to the phenomenon of 
hyperpluralism. But what kind of answer is this? In the first instance, the notion of 
multivariate democratic polity seems to be a restatement of the problem it should answer: 
just another term to refer to the fact of hyperpluralism in a democratic political society. 
                                                                                                                                               
 
2 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review, 64 (1997), 
3, pp. 765-807, p. 786. 
     
 
JURA GENTIUM XIV 2017 
 
 
83 
 
The notion of multivariate democratic polity is introduced then to refer to the fact that in 
contemporary democratic societies there is a coexistence of multiple and variable orders 
of relations between groups and their respective comprehensive conceptions – 
overlapping consensus and modus vivendi would be not exclusive, but would coexist 
alongside variable geometries.  
On closer inspection, the notion of the multivariate democratic polity, rather than 
being a bare restatement of the fact of hyperpluralism, could be interpreted as a model 
that re-describes the way political liberalism captures the fact of pluralism. In this sense, 
the multivariate democratic polity is a second order notion introduced as an amendment 
of the received interpretation of the scheme of Political Liberalism, understood as 
involving a sort of linear, homogeneous and preordained progression of polities from 
religious conflict, up to modus vivendi, constitutional consensus, and finally overlapping 
consensus (DH, p. 105). I would say that the notion of multivariate democratic polity is 
firstly a diagnostic tool, which is useful insofar as it can help us to detect and to bring into 
question the underlying consensualist teleological scheme of standard interpretations of 
political liberalism, where some kind of (overlapping) consensus is understood as the 
final stage of a process of historical and logical completion. Consequently, such a notion 
is to my mind useful insofar as it leads us to reconceive of the relation between consensus 
and dissent and the role they play in political legitimacy. According to Ferrara himself, 
the multivariate democratic polity conception  
constitutes the best response to the tenuousness of consensus and the ubiquity of dissent 
that political liberalism can offer, in line with the premise (often neglected or contradicted 
by most of its agonistic interpreters) of an enduring relevance of the distinction between 
legitimate coercion and arbitrary oppression (DH, p. 108).  
Still, as I will argue, this is a point where Ferrara is not radical enough and does 
not draw all the conclusions that to my mind should follow also at the normative level 
from the endorsement of such an understanding of the relation between consensus and 
dissent. 
Meta-theoretical arguments 
As we have seen, the multivariate democratic polity is first presented as a “last resort way 
to remedy the shortcomings of public reason” (DH, p. 107) – a remedy for the failure of 
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conjectural arguments. And secondly as a (second order) answer to the tenuousness of 
consensus and the ubiquity of dissent. But how does this work exactly? In dealing with 
this problem, I will now consider some meta-theoretical ambiguities of such a notion. The 
first thing to note is that it is not clear whether such a conception amounts to an argument 
and to whom it is addressed. When conjectural arguments fail to convince those who 
follow some comprehensive conceptions, what is the multivariate democratic polity 
conception supposed to do? First, it does not seem to consist of a last resort argument, 
which should convince those who did not accept conjectural ones. If those arguments, 
which did not involve any shared premises, could not work, one cannot see what argument 
could now work for convincing the skeptics. Moreover, the multivariate democratic polity 
conception does not seem to have, prima facie, the form of an argument. At first sight, as 
we have seen, it seems to be just a restatement, or a re-description, of the fact of 
hyperpluralism. Now, important as it may be to get this fact of contemporary democratic 
societies right, this move is not per se an argument that could be used to convince anyone 
to be a pluralist. I cannot convince anyone to endorse pluralism just by stating that 
hyperpluralism is a fact of contemporary democratic societies (nor by saying that it works 
because the consent it provides, though not universally widespread, is enough to establish 
a multivariate polity).  
But as we have seen, the notion of multivariate democratic polity could rather be 
interpreted as a meta-theoretical device, a notion introduced to amend the received 
interpretation of the scheme of political liberalism. If we assume this, then it is again clear 
that its addressees cannot be those minorities who fail to be convinced by conjectural 
arguments. Still, this allows us to reconstruct the multivariate democratic polity 
conception as being a part of some kind of meta-theoretical argument. This would be an 
argument addressed on the one hand to political liberalist theories – a sort of self-reflexive 
argument where political liberalism aims to prove to itself to have enough resources to 
cope with the fact of hyperpluralism if only it manages to modify some of its conceptual 
tools on how to understand the relation between consent and dissent. On the other hand, 
this argument would be aimed at those agonistic political theories, such as Mouffe’s, 
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Tully’s and Wingenbach’s,3 which deny that political liberalism can treat dissent and 
conflict in an adequate way. 
Now that we have specified the intended target of the argument we can better 
reconstruct its form. This argument seems to firstly involve a descriptive appeal to a fact 
– “hey look, in hyperpluralist societies overlapping consensus and modus vivendi are 
variously intertwined and are not mutually exclusive”. And secondly it involves the 
proposal of a theoretical model (the multivariate one) that can describe this fact 
adequately and that is consistent with political liberalism. The argument would then be 
that political liberalism can still be a convincing model since there can be an overlapping 
consensus robust enough to sustain and legitimate the basic structure and the 
constitutional essentials even when some minorities or a majority of minorities are only 
partially reasonable, that is, even when dissent is widespread – as happens to be the case 
today. If reconstructed this way, the multivariate conception could be interpreted as a 
realist adaptive argument – a “last resort” to adapt political liberalism to a situation which 
is not considered the best possible and is rather quite inhospitable for it. The linear 
progression from religious conflict up to overlapping consensus would continue to be the 
first choice, but now we can be reassured that political liberalism can survive and function 
also within factual conditions where this does not occur. If so, then the multivariate 
conception would not really modify the viewpoint of political liberalism on consent and 
dissent, because the burden of political legitimation would still be based exclusively on 
the former and on its teleological deployment. 
But there is another way to interpret the descriptive component of the argument. 
This may involve not only a sort of realistic acceptance of de facto hyperpluralism, but 
also a constitutive component. On this stronger reading, the varying intertwinement 
between overlapping consensus, constitutional consensus, modus vivendi and conflict, 
would not just be a contingent fact of societies nowadays, but a constitutive fact of 
political legitimacy. Democratic political legitimacy is constituted by an interplay of 
consensus and dissent, and not just a matter of legitimate consent but also of legitimate 
                                                                                                                                               
 
3 See Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, London, Verso, 2000; J. Tully, Public Philosophy in a 
New Key, vol. 1: Democracy and Civic Freedom, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008; E. 
Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy: Post-Foundationalism and Political Liberalism, 
Farnham, Ashgate, 2011. 
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dissent: and a multivariate democratic polity would represent in this sense an increase in 
the quality of political legitimation, because it would better embody its normative 
architecture. If it were based on such a constitutive description of democratic polity, then 
Ferrara’s conception could give rise to a normative argument. Whereas the reconstruction 
of the realist argument tells us that political legitimation can function also within 
hyperpluralism, the normative argument reconstruction would say that political 
legitimation at its best should be conceived in multivariate terms and would work better 
this way. To my mind, it is not clear which of these alternatives is followed by Ferrara in 
the book and a certain amount of oscillation between the realist descriptive argument and 
the normative argument is to be detected. I take the second option to be more promising, 
because it points toward a deeper transformation of the notion of democratic political 
legitimacy, which in my opinion, if we take hyperpluralism seriously, needs to embody 
dissent within itself as a constitutive fact.4 
Transnational democratic legitimacy and dualist constitutionalism 
In chapter 7 of DH, “Beyond the Nation: Governance and Deliberative Democracy”, 
Ferrara addresses the question of democratic legitimacy from a transnational perspective. 
The multivariate framework is here an advantageous point of departure, since it can offer 
a theoretical model to account for contexts characterized by a low degree of initial 
convergence and a variable geometry of dissent and consent, and as such can be extended 
very well to emerging transnational dynamics. And I find also extremely fruitful the 
vaguely pragmatic and Deweyan methodological approach adopted by Ferrara, according 
to whom it would be a fallacy to apply old standards of democraticness, modeled on 
domestic regimes and state-like polities, to the new context of the worldly society (DH, 
pp. 19, 167). When it comes to the evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of 
transnational contexts, we rather need to elaborate new standards which adapt themselves 
to current problems rather than to apply received standards, which were solutions to old 
problems posed by previous contexts. Such an approach furnishes us with an interesting 
                                                                                                                                               
 
4 For a notion of legitimacy based on the interplay of dissent and consent, and for a model of 
reconstruction of democracy as progressive institutionalization of legitimate dissent, see I. Testa, “Dissenso 
e legittimità democratica”, in P. Costa (ed.), Tolleranza e riconoscimento, Bologna, EDB, 2014, pp. 143-
159. 
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tool, which allows us to see that many contemporary diagnoses concerning the alleged 
crisis of democracy are wholly based on disputable methodological assumptions and tend 
to overlook the dynamic transformative character of political concepts.  
In this spirit, Ferrara argues that practices of supranational global governance 
seem to necessarily involve a democratic deficit only if we apply to them standards 
modeled on domestic democratic contests. And he defends the thesis that on the contrary 
practices of global governance can be shown to be compatible with democratic legitimacy 
(DH, pp. 19-20), provided that we adopt a deliberative approach to democracy on the one 
hand, and that we conceive of governance as a method of ruling which would differ from 
state-like government insofar as it would not involve the threat of sanction but would 
rather be based on soft-law, best practices, benchmarking and moral suasion.  
Now there is really a lot that is not democratic in contemporary practices of 
supranational governance based on technocratic, expert-guided negotiations, vertical 
processes of decision making, and, as is unfortunately increasingly the case with the EU, 
prevailing intergovernmental power relations. However, Ferrara does not want to 
legitimate this lamentable situation but aims rather at giving us some novel normative 
standards to evaluate and possibly democratically improve the legitimacy of transnational 
governance. In what follows I will analyze some conceptual tools, which Ferrara adopts 
in order to rethink democratic legitimacy in this new context. In particular, I will 
concentrate on the bridging role which the dualist conception of democratic 
constitutionalism plays within Ferrara’s model in order to rethink the democratic 
legitimacy of transnational governance and I will argue that this move is not wholly 
consistent with the multivariate framework.  
The dualist conception is introduced by Ferrara as a means to overcome the 
problem that, if we are to judge governance on the basis of the classical criterion of the 
legislative authority of the demos – the idea that citizens obey laws of which they are 
themselves the authors, or in other terms the normative criterion of the consent by the 
governed (DH, p. 177) – then processes of governance may seem massively deficient as 
regards democratic legitimacy. Ferrara proposes overcoming this problem by adopting 
here, on the transnational level, the sort of bipartition between two levels of the authorial 
function that is posited by the dualist conception of democratic constitutionalism. 
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According to the latter model, elaborated by Ackerman, and adopted also by Michelman 
and by Rawls’s “principle of liberal legitimacy”5, we are to distinguish between two 
levels of political legitimacy and two respective forms of authorial function (DH, pp. 177-
178). We would place here at the upper, “constitutional” level the institutional framework 
concerning constitutional law making, and the correlative constitutional essentials. And 
at the lower, “subconstitutional” or “ordinary” level, would be legislative, administrative, 
and judicial acts. Democratic authorship as specified by the principle of the consent of 
the governed would apply directly only to the upper level. Whereas the lower level may 
follow different paths (including technocratic and expert-like forms of regulation), not 
involving the full authorship of the demos, and would be legitimated indirectly by its 
consistency with the principles assented to at the upper level. 
The first thing to note here is that the dualist model is clearly not only a case of a 
political conception of legitimacy which has been originally elaborated on the domestic 
scale, as Ferrara himself is aware of, but is also to my mind heavily indebted to the 
architecture of national political spaces. It seems to presuppose a state-like structure, and 
an established constitutional tradition, where a level of constitutional law and connected 
political procedures is clearly identifiable and distinguishable from ordinary law. This 
may engender from the very beginning the risk of falling back to the domestic fallacy. 
Hence, I think here Ferrara would have the burden of proving that the dualist model can 
be adapted to a transnational context in a way that escapes this problem. Unfortunately, 
there are a number of difficulties here that are pretty hard to overcome and that are 
connected to the multivariate structure of transnational spaces.  
Let’s use here as a guiding thread the EU, the example of transnational democratic 
legitimacy most frequently cited by Ferrara as an emblematic one. Let’s first leave aside 
the (not unreasonable) position according to which there is no properly identifiable 
constitutional level in the architecture of the EU, but what we have at the moment is rather 
an intergovernmental treaty – the Lisbon Treaty – that has been adopted as a last resort 
remedy after the failure of the European Constitutional Treaty, which had not been 
                                                                                                                                               
 
5 See B. Ackerman, We the People, Vol. 1, Foundations, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 
1991; F.I. Michelman, “How Can the People Ever Make the Laws? A Critique of Deliberative Democracy”, 
in J. Bohman, W. Rehg (eds.), Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1997; J. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 137. 
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consented to by the French and the Dutch people, and which was in any event not a 
constitutional text, but rather an intergovernmental treaty aimed at having constitutional 
effects. Ferrara clearly is not a supporter of this skeptical attitude towards the treaties and, 
along with post-national and pluralist constitutional theories of the so-called new 
constitutionalism,6 assumes rather that the Constitutional Treaty, The Lisbon Treaty, 
together with the pronouncements of the European Court of Justice (such as the judgment 
“Les Verts”, April 23, 1986), already represent a sui generis European process of 
constitutionalization, which may be said to be legitimate even in the absence of a 
European demos acting as a constituent power. The problem here arises because this 
model of constitutionalization as an emerging process is clearly based on a multileveled 
and composited architecture which is hard to combine with the clear-cut distinction 
between a higher and a lower level that the dualist conception presupposes. Whereas the 
latter architecture is a hierarchical and top-down one, where legitimation is transmitted 
from the upper to the lower level, the multileveled process of constitutional emergence – 
if it is not just another neoliberal strategy to give a decisive power to judicial authority 
and technocratic elites and to limit popular accountability, as some of his critics assume7 
– should be meant to be the composited result of a horizontal, netlike process plus both 
top-down and bottom-up dynamics. The question is not only, as some may argue, that 
here what the constitutional essentials to which we are supposed to consent to is not very 
clear – free and equal consent of the citizens to what exactly? – or at least are subject to 
a never-ending process of transformation. More importantly, even if we suppose that, at 
some given point, some constitutional essentials are specifiable, these are to a great extent 
to be conceived as something which also emerges from processes that, from the 
perspective of the dualist conception, are very often conceived of as emerging from the 
“ordinary” level of legislative, administrative and judicial acts. Hence, the dualism 
between constitutional and subconstitutional level, which was modelled on a more 
                                                                                                                                               
 
6 See for instance G. Amato, “L’originalità istituzionale dell’Unione europea”, in G. Preterossi (ed.), Un 
passato che passa?, Roma, Fahrenheit 451, 2000, pp. 81-91; I. Pernice, “Multilevel Constitutionalism in 
the European Union”, European Law Review, 27 (2002), 5, pp. ; J.H.H. Weiler, M. Wind, (eds.), European 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
7 See for example L. Hilbink, “Assessing the New Constitutionalism”, Comparative Politics, 40 (2008), 
2, pp. 227-245. 
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traditional and state like form of constitutionalism – where the bounds of constitutional 
law-making are at least sufficiently clear cut – does not seem to be wholly compatible 
with the multilevel model of transnational constitutional process, which Ferrara is keen 
to adopt. 
Furthermore, the dualist conception seems to be deeply indebted to a consent 
model of political legitimacy, where the source of legitimacy is established at the upper 
level by some form of consent (be it some sort of original position or else of overlapping 
consensus), whereas dissent does not play a constitutive role and is rather understood as 
a residuum or a local perturbation manifested at the lower level. But if we take the 
multilevel dynamics of constitutionalization seriously, and we conceive of it in terms of 
a multivariate transnational polity, then we should assume that there cannot be a clear-cut 
bipartition between consensus and dissent and the allocation of these to two different 
levels, but rather that they are intertwined as constitutive elements of legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the multileveled process of transnational constitutionalization is combined 
with what Rosanvallon has analyzed as an ongoing process of pluralization and 
differentiation of forms of legitimacy – including not only consent-based “electoral” 
legitimacy but also “impartial”, “reflexive” and “proximity” legitimacy8 – which again is 
hardly compatible with the dualist bipartition of authorship. And this also affects the way 
we are to conceive forms of transnational governance, since, if we assume this 
description, then also Ferrara’s definition of governance as a “monopoly on the attribution 
of legitimacy” (DH, p. 174) may seem in need of being reformulated: the current 
phenomenon of differentiation of forms of legitimacy seems rather to bring into question 
the idea that a monopoly of it can be effective. 
Citizenship authorship, deliberation, and transnational demos 
I would now like to have a closer look at the governance-based notion of democratic 
authorship proposed by Ferrara. What are the normative criteria that specify it? The 
definition of governance as a method of “ruling without compelling” cannot of course 
suffice to specify normative criteria of democratic legitimacy, since there can be forms 
                                                                                                                                               
 
8 P. Rosanvallon, Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity, Princeton and Oxford, 
Princeton University Press, 2011. 
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of governance – for instance in financial capitalism – which do rule by imposing sanctions 
for non compliance but that are still not democratic. Ruling without compelling could be 
a necessary but not sufficient standard for postnational democratic authorship, which 
means that the notion of governance itself needs to undergo further normative criteria. A 
clue is offered by Ferrara when he writes that methods of governance do not necessarily 
represent a burden for democracy  
if and only if they (a) take place within the boundaries of “constitutional essentials” that 
meet with the consent of free and equal citizens as manifested in referenda or in more 
indirect but still recognizable ways and (b) some recognizable form of accountability 
remains in place (DH, p. 178).  
Here, the dualist conception of constitutionalism seems to offer in clause (a) the first 
normative criterion needed to distinguish between legitimate and non legitimate forms of 
governance. But a problem immediately arises because, as we have seen, in the multilevel 
process of constitutionalization of Europe, for instance, the boundaries of what are to be 
considered the “constitutional essentials” are rather contested and may not be so 
determined in themselves. Moreover, even the subjects of this process of 
constitutionalization are rather variable. As Ferrara himself writes, if we are keen to say 
that there is here some form of “citizenship authorship”, then we must accept that it is 
“much more indirect than the authorship to which we are used in the domestic 
framework” (DH, p. 181). It is some kind of authorship not in the hands of a single 
identifiable subject, but rather “located at the crossroads of the European Parliament, the 
European Commission, and intergovernmental bodies such as the European Council” 
(DH, p. 181). Here it is clear that we would need at least some further criteria to evaluate, 
in light of democratic authorship, the balance between these components. Otherwise, 
everything would go, and we would be left with the unsatisfactory outcome, which is 
what is happening nowadays. Intergovernmental bodies are overly dominant and 
depriving the other components of decisional power – look at what is happening as 
regards to who is going to conduct the negotiations over the UK’s exit from the EU – and 
this would be wholly legitimate within Ferrara’s framework. Hence, even if we were keen 
to accept the dualist conception of authorship as being adequate in a transnational context 
and not affected by a domestic analogy fallacy, I do not think this could alone offer the 
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alleged kind of top-down legitimacy for governance practices. It is certainly the case that 
dualist approaches to national constitutional democracy are, as we know, already 
challenged by those who find this “legal” model of constitutionalism, which revolves 
around judicial review and tends to “juridify” political confrontation, to be inherently 
paternalist and depoliticizing.9 But at least at the domestic level the boundaries of legal 
constitutionalism are identifiable, and their relation to representative democracy is 
established by a constitutional tradition and/or procedures. However, when we step to the 
transnational level and the fluid process of its constitutionalization, all this remains much 
more undetermined and permeable to vertical and non-transparent dynamics that are more 
worrying and risk remaining unchecked. 
Even if we leave aside these questions connected with the dualist conception, and 
come back to clause (a) of the formulation of democratic legitimacy offered above – “if 
and only if they (a) take place within the boundaries of constitutional essentials that meet 
with the consent of free and equal citizens” – we can realize that at the very end the 
stronger normative standard is that of the free and equal consent of the citizens. Important 
as consent may be, I think that a renewed notion of democratic authorship should also 
incorporate within it dissent as a source of legitimacy – democracy is a process that 
progressively institutionalizes dissent (individual rights, majority vote, social rights, 
rights to strike, rights to conscientious objections are in many aspects also 
institutionalized forms of dissent) – and for this reason I would prefer the clause to instead 
be “if and only if they (a) take place within the boundaries of constitutional essentials that 
meet with the consent of free and equal citizens and allow for legitimate dissent”.  
Now let’s leave aside the previous point, which would need a longer discourse 
than we have time for here, and consider the fact that in his book Ferrara proposes 
adopting a deliberative paradigm in order to rethink democratic authorship. I think we 
should read in this light the normative constraint that Ferrara poses when writing that 
methods of governance are not a burden for democracy if and only if the free and equal 
consent by the citizens is “manifested in referenda or in more indirect but still 
                                                                                                                                               
 
9 See R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of 
Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007; J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1999; M. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, Princeton, 
Princeton University, Press, 1999. 
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recognizable ways and (b) some recognizable form of accountability remains in place”. 
Accountability, important as it may be, is here a criterion (b) subordinated to clause (a) 
and as such is clearly not enough to specify normative criteria for the democraticness of 
governance. Hence, the normative priority is to be assigned to the specification of clause 
(a), that is to the criterion that the free and equal consent of citizens be somehow 
manifested “in referenda or in more indirect but still recognizable ways”. A strong, 
deliberative reading of this specification requires that the formation of consent (and 
dissent) be part of some sort of deliberative process (of which referenda are an instance). 
This offers us then a clue as to the question of the normative criteria that should 
distinguish between democratic and non-democratic forms of governance. It is in the end 
some notion of deliberation that should offer us a stronger standard for democratic 
legitimacy.  
For methods of governance, it is not enough to take place within the boundaries 
of constitutional essentials – whatever they may be – nor to meet with the formal consent 
of free and equal citizens, nor to be somehow accountable. They need in the end to comply 
with standards of public deliberation. They have to be rooted in deliberative processes 
and somehow contribute to enhancing the quality of them. But this is a point which is to 
my mind required by Ferrara’s strategy, but that remains rather underdetermined. Here it 
is not enough to appeal to the fact that in transnational contexts such as the EU, citizenship 
authorship is “much more indirect than the authorship which is located at the domestic 
framework” (DH, p. 181). Because this fact is part of the problem we are faced with, that 
is, the problem that at the fluid crossroads between European Parliament, the European 
Commission, and dominating intergovernmental bodies such as the European Council 
and other more informal and restricted bilateral or trilateral meetings, it is not at all clear 
in what sort of deliberative process – indirect as it may be – citizenship authorship is 
taking place. The problem is that these crossroads – which by the way include processes 
that could be classified both at the alleged constitutional higher level, and the alleged 
subconstitutional, ordinary level – are not governed by enlarged deliberative processes in 
the proper sense, but are rather mainly being reshaped by interstate power relations and 
technocratic dynamics molded by them. Now this may be a factual circumstance that 
Ferrara’s framework could help us to denounce as not legitimate – or not fully legitimate 
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– if it could better specify how and where deliberative bodies of citizenship could be 
located here. If forms of governance are not rooted in deliberative processes, they cannot 
be said to have a full democratic legitimacy.  
Of course democracy is not necessarily based on majority vote, and we have 
apprehended from the deliberative paradigm, as Ferrara notes, that majority vote is not 
the only, and maybe not the best method of deliberation (DH, pp. 176-177). Still, can we 
really frame in terms of processes of democratic deliberation what is happening at the 
mentioned crossroads? I think this is more than simply a factual problem concerning the 
current state of the EU, but instead is also connected with constitutional theory. As Ferrara 
notes, the deliberative democracy paradigm requires both an object of deliberation, a 
deliberating process, and a deliberating body, a subject of deliberation (DH, pp. 168-169). 
On the other hand, while confronting himself with the no demos thesis, Ferrara assumes 
together with new constitutionalism that the EU represents a novel and peculiar situation 
where the relation between constitutional treaty and state apparatus is weakened. Here we 
would have to deal with a higher law of a supranational polity of citizens rather than with 
the higher law of a state, for which a national demos would be needed as a legitimating 
source (DH, p. 181). But here the problem is that in this new situation there is either no 
deliberative subject, or else, if there is one, it is not at all clear if and how citizens are 
included within it even in an indirect way. And we cannot be satisfied with the fact that 
members of the EU parliament are democratically elected by EU citizens, and that 
national governments that operate in the EU council are democratically elected at the 
national level. What happens at the crossroads between these institutions is hardly to be 
represented as a process of deliberation – what sort? – of democratically elected 
representatives and seems to follow a pretty different logic, increasingly modelled by 
interstate power relations. 
For the above mentioned reasons I think that even those who are keen to abandon 
a strong notion of democratic authorship, and a strong connection between constitution, 
state apparatus and nation, should reconsider the question of the demos. If both 
transnational constitutional practices and practices of governance do not include citizens 
in a deliberative process, we cannot be satisfied as to their democratic legitimacy. But for 
this to happen, the supranational polity of citizens must be engaged in supranational 
     
 
JURA GENTIUM XIV 2017 
 
 
95 
 
practices of democratic citizenship. Now, it is certainly the case that democracy, as 
Ferrara assumes, is better understood as an ethos, and the latter can be understood as an 
individual attitude, a passion for openness to which, as in the nice quote from Dewey that 
opens the book, institutions should conform rather than the other way round.10 Still, 
individual attitudes, to be such, have to be developed through and within shared practices. 
For individuals to have standing, stable democratic attitudes, there must be a democratic 
life-form of practices they embody and sustain. And this cannot just consist of a spurious 
mix of constitutional judicial reviews, top-down methods of governance, 
intergovernmental power relations, plus some indirect deliberation provided by the 
democratically elected representative in the EU parliament: if not also supported by 
practices of political subjectivation, there cannot be any supranational polity of citizens. 
Here the question of the demos strikes back. We do not necessarily need to think it as a 
substantive, already given entity at the national level. In fact, the question of the 
emergence and consolidation of a transnational demos as a legitimating source and scope 
is still the crucial question for contemporary democracy, since in its absence legitimizing 
deliberation, even in its indirect forms, cannot succeed. 
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10 “Democracy is a personal way of individual life […] it signifies the possession and continual use of 
certain attitudes, forming personal character and determining desire and purpose in all the relations of life. 
Instead of thinking of our own dispositions and habits as accommodated to certain institutions we have to 
learn to think of the latter as expressions, projections and extensions of habitually dominant personal 
attitudes” (J. Dewey, “Creative Democracy. The Task Before Us”, in John Dewey and the Promise of 
America, Progressive Education Booklet No. 14, Columbus, Ohio, American Education Press, 1939). 
